Lebanese Civil War

• For the civil conflict of 1958, see Lebanon crisis of 1958.

Lebanese Civil War
Date 1975 - 1990 Location Lebanon Result Taif Agreement
Belligerents
Lebanese Christian Phalangist	Palestinian refugees
Commanders and leaders
Elie Hobeika Bachir Gemayel Saad Haddad	Walid Jumblatt Yasser Arafat Musa Sadr
Casualties and losses
More than 100,000 dead and 100,000 maimed

The Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) had its origin in the conflicts and political compromises of Lebanon's colonial period and was exacerbated by the nation's changing demographic trends, Christian and Muslim inter-religious strife, and the involvement of Syria, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). After a short break in the fighting in 1976 due to Arab League mediation and Syrian intervention, civil strife continued, with the focus of the fighting primarily in south Lebanon, controlled first by the PLO, then occupied by Israel.

During the course of the fighting, alliances shifted rapidly and unpredictably, and by the end of the war, nearly every party had allied with and subsequently betrayed every one else at least once. The 1980s were especially bleak, with much of Beirut laid in ruins during the Israeli invasion that evicted the PLO from the country. The war deteriorated ever further into ethnic and religious carnage, and in the end, Lebanon's independence counted among the casualties.

By the time of the Taif Agreement in 1989, Israel held on to a security zone in southern Lebanon that they justified as a buffer to prevent attacks on northern Israel. The Israeli Army eventually withdrew in 2000, but only to see Syria fill the void from positions it had held in northern Lebanon since the mid-70s. Syria did not withdraw its troops before 2005, when it was forced out by the joint pressure created by Lebanese protest and powerful diplomatic intervention from the USA, France and the UN.

Constitutionally guaranteed Christian control of the government had come under increasing fire from Muslims and secular left wing groups in the 1960s, leading them to join forces as the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) in 1969. The LNM called for the taking of a new census (the last one had been conducted in 1932) and the subsequent drafting of a new governmental structure that would reflect the actual population balance. This was perceived as a mortal threat for Christian (especially Maronite) power in Lebanon, although alliances were admittedly much more complex than the "Muslims versus Christians" rubric posited by some Maronite leaders and many outside observers.

The two sides were unable to reconcile their conflicts of interest and began forming militias, first for self-protection, but as things escalated ever more in parallel to the regular army. This rapidly undermined the authority of the central government. The government's ability to maintain order was also handicapped by the nature of the Lebanese Army. One of the smallest in the Middle East, it was composed based on a fixed ratio of religions. As members defected to sectarian militias, the army would eventually prove unable to contain the militant groups, rein in the PLO or monitor foreign infiltration. Also, since the government was Christian-dominated, and the officers' ranks especially so, trust among Muslims for central institutions including the army was low. The disintegration of the Lebanese Army was eventually initiated by Muslim deserters declaring that they would no longer take orders from the Maronite generals.

Throughout the war most or all militias operated with little regard for human rights, and the sectarian character of the conflict made non-combatant civilians a frequent target. As the war dragged on, the militias deteriorated ever further into mafia style organizations with many commanders turning to crime as their main preoccupation, rather than fighting. Finances for the war effort were obtained in one or all of three ways:

• Outside support, generally from one of the rivalling Arab governments or Israel, or a superpower, often with strings attached. Alliances would shift frequently.
• Preying on the population. Extortion, theft, bank robberies and random checkpoints at which "customs" would be collected, were commonplace on all sides. During cease-fires, most militias operated in their home areas as virtual mafia organizations.
• Smuggling. During the civil war, Lebanon turned into one of the world's largest narcotics producers, with much of the hashish production centered in the Bekaa valley. But much else was also smuggled, such as guns and supplies, all kinds of stolen goods and regular trade - war or no war, Lebanon would not give up its role as the middleman in European-Arab business. Many battles were fought over Lebanon's ports, to gain smuggler's access to the sea routes.

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Christian militias armed by West Germany and Belgium drew supporters from the larger and poorer Christian population in the north of the country. They were generally right-wing in their political outlook, some of them formed under early impulses from European Fascism. All the major Christian militias were Maronite-dominated, and other Christian sects played a secondary role.

The most powerful of the Christian militias was that of the Kataeb, or Phalange, under the leadership of Bachir Gemayel. The Phalange went on to help found in 1977 the Lebanese Forces which came under the leadership of Samir Geagea in 1986. A smaller faction was the extremist Guardians of the Cedars. These militias quickly established strongholds in Christian-dominated East Beirut, also the site of many government buildings.

In the north, the Marada Brigades served as the private militia of the Franjieh family and Zgharta.

The Shi'a militias were slow to form and join in the fighting. Initially, many Shi'a had been drawn to the Palestinian movement and the Lebanese Communist Party, but after 1970's Black September, there followed a sudden influx of armed Palestinians to the Shi'a areas. The Palestinian movement quickly squandered its influence with the Shi'a, as radical factions ruled by the gun in much of Shi'a-inhabited southern Lebanon, where the refugee camps were accidentally concentrated, and the mainstream PLO proved either unwilling or unable to rein them in.

The Palestinian radicals' secularism and arrogant behaviour had alienated the traditionalist Shi'a community, but simultaneously presented a model for revolutionary politics that appealed to the young of Lebanon's poorest and most downtrodden community. After many years without their own independent political organizations, there suddenly arose Musa Sadr's Amal Movement in 1974-75. Its moderate Islamist ideology immediately attracted the urban poor, and Amal's armed ranks grew rapidly. Later, in the early 1980s, a hard line faction would break away to join with Shi'a groups fighting Israel to form the Hizbullah guerrillas, whom to this day remain the most powerful militia of Lebanon. Hizbullah was initially aided and trained by Iran, and since the late 1980s, Hizbullah has also received backing from Syria.

Some Sunni factions received support from Libya and Iraq, and a number of minor militias existed, the more prominent with Nasserist or otherwise pan-Arab and Arab nationalist leanings, but a minor few Islamist. The main Sunni-led organization was the al-Murabitun. To compensate for weakness on the battlefield, the Sunni leadership turned early in the war to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which was dominated by Palestinian Sunnis, although it also had a sizable Christian (mainly Greek Orthodox) minority.

File:Walid Jumblatt.jpg

The small Druze sect, strategically and dangerously seated on the Chouf in central Lebanon, had no natural allies, and so were compelled to put much effort into building (and breaking) alliances. Under the leadership of the Jumblatt family, first Kamal Jumblatt (the LNM leader) and then his son Walid, the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) served as an effective Druze militia, building excellent ties to the Soviet Union.

Although several Lebanese militias claimed to be secular, most were little but vehicles for sectarian interest. Still, there existed a number of non-religious groups, primarily but not exclusively of the far-left. Examples of this was the pro-Moscow Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) and the more radical and independent Communist Action Organization (COA). Another notable example was the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), which promoted the concept of Greater Syria, in contrast to Pan-Arab or Lebanese nationalism. The SSNP was generally aligned with the Syrian government, although it did not ideologically approve of Hafez al-Assad's Ba'thist regime.

The Palestinian movement, which had relocated most of its fighting strength to Lebanon after being expelled from Jordan in the events known as Black September in 1970, was formally under the umbrella of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) - by itself undoubtedly Lebanon's most potent fighting force. But in actuality, the PLO was little more than a loose confederation, and its leader, Yassir Arafat, proved unable to control rival factions. This undermined both the PLO's operative strength and the sympathy of the Lebanese for the PLO, as the organization's outside image was increasingly being set by Communist radicals, whose "revolutionary order" rarely turned out to be anything other than protection rackets. In the end, the PLO was held together more by shared interests and Arafat's continual attempts at intra-organizational mediation, than by any coherent organizational structure.

The mainstream PLO, represented by Arafat's powerful Fatah guerrillas, initially hesitated to take sides, but was eventually dragged into open conflict by more radical Palestinian factions. These were encouraged by radical Arab states such as Syria, Iraq and Libya, and espoused Arab socialist or Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Among the most important were the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and its splinter, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Lesser roles were played by the fractious Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) and another split-off from the PFLP, the Syrian-aligned Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC). To complicate things, the Ba'thist systems of Syria and Iraq both set up Palestinian puppet organizations within the PLO. The as-Sa'iqa was a Syrian-controlled militia, parallelled by the Arab Liberation Front (ALF) under Iraqi command. The Syrian government could also count on the Syrian brigades of the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA), formally but not functionally the PLO's regular army. Some PLA units sent by Egypt were under PLO (Arafatist) control, but never played the same dominant role as the heavily armed Syrian-backed factions.

In 1974, a stone was added to Arafat's burden with the near-formal breakup of the PLO. A controversial proposal (the Ten Point Program) that aimed to make way for a two-state solution had been advanced by Arafat and Fatah in the Palestinian National Council (PNC). Under furious accusations of treason, much of the PLO's left wing simply walked out of the organization. With Iraqi, and later Syrian and Libyan, backing, they formed the Rejectionist Front, espousing a no-compromise line towards Israel. The defectors included the PFLP, the PFLP-GC, the PLF, as-Sa'iqa, ALF and several others, and discontent mounted also within Fatah. Arafat would eventually manage to patch up the differences, but this would come back to haunt him throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, and the split effectively prevented organizational unity in crucial stages of PLO's involvement in the Lebanese civil war.

As a result of the Cairo Agreement brokered by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1969, the Lebanese were forced to allow a foreign force (the PLO) to conduct military operations against Israel from their own territory. The PLO were granted full control over the refugee camps, but soon much of southern Lebanon fell under their effective rule. As fighters poured in from Jordan after the Black September destruction of the PLO's apparatus there, the PLO's presence became overbearing to many of inhabitants of these areas. The radical factions operated as a law unto themselves, and quickly alienated conservative Shi'a villagers. Much the same way that the PLO had lost its welcome in Jordan, Muslim support for the Palestinians began to erode in Lebanon. The Christians were already lost.

A significant left-wing opposition also started to evolve within Fatah, as radical veteran fighters from Jordan began pouring into its ranks, to the worry of not least Arafat himself. Still, Arafat set about building a "state-within-the-state" in southern Lebanon, to create a secure base area for the PLO, headquartered in the Bekaa Valley and West Beirut. Gradually the Lebanese authorities were being pushed into irrelevancy. Harsh Israeli retribution after Palestinian raids from what was now termed "Fatahland" did nothing to endear the civilian Shi'a and Christian population to the Palestinian guerrillas.

The PLO was welcomed, however, by the Sunnis - who thought of them as a natural ally in sectarian terms - and by the Druze. A personal friendship developed between Arafat and the charismatic Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, who not only headed the PSP, but who had also set up a Lebanese National Movement (LNM) to finally redress the wrongs of the sectarian quota system. Many of the Rejectionist Front organizations joined the leftist LNM straightway, and indeed portions of the Fatah left followed. But Arafat was unwilling to commit the Palestinians to what he regarded as an intra-Lebanese conflict, fearing it would bog the movement down in Lebanon and unnecessarily alienate potential supporters among the Christians and their foreign allies.

Throughout the Spring of 1975, minor clashes had been building up towards all-out conflict, with the LNM pitted against the Phalange, and the ever-weaker national government wavering between the need to maintain order and cater to its Christian constituency. On the morning of April 13, 1975, unidentified gunmen in a speeding car fired on a group of Phalangist leaders leaving Church in the Christian Beirut suburb of Ain Rumaneh, killing four people in what was probably an attempt on the life of Pierre Gemayel. Hours later, Phalangists led by the Gemayels, killed 27 Palestinian workers travelling on a bus in Ein Al-Rumaneh; citywide clashes erupted. On December 6, 1975, four Christians were killed in East Beirut. In retaliation, the Phalange erected roadblocks throughout the city, where identification cards were inspected for religious belonging. Any Palestinian or Muslim caught was killed by having his throat cut. Opposing militias retaliated, and in growing reprisals, some 600 Muslims and Christians were butchered, on what became known as Black Saturday. After this point, there was no going back, and all-out fighting began between the militias.

In a vicious spiral of sectarian violence, civilians were an easy target. On January 18, 1976 about 1,000 people were killed by Christian forces in the Karantina Massacre, immediately followed by a Palestinian retaliatory strike on Damour. Those inhabitants who did not manage to flee the village as it was assaulted by a motley crew of militias led by Abu Musa, were gunned down or killed with knives; hundreds perished. These two massacres prompted a mass exodus of Muslims and Christians, as people fearing retribution fled to areas under the control of their own sect. The ethnic/religious layout of the residential areas of the capital encouraged this process, and East and West Beirut were increasingly transformed into what was in effect Christian and Muslim Beirut. Also, the number of Christian leftists who had allied with the LNM, and Muslim conservatives with the government, dropped sharply, as the war revealed itself as an utterly sectarian conflict. Another effect of the massacres were to bring in Yassir Arafat's well-armed Fatah and thereby PLO on the side of the LNM, as Palestinian sentiment was by now completely hostile to the Lebanese Christian forces.

Destruction of Damour

Two days later, January 20, 1976, Palestinians and their leftist allies launched their final assault on the Christian town of Damour which lay across the Sidon - Beirut highway about 20 km south of Beirrut. The relentless pounding the town received resulted in the deaths of many. In the siege that had been established on 9 January the Palestinians cut off food and water supplies and refused to allow the Red Cross to take out the wounded. Infants and children as well as the elderly died of dehydration.

On January 16, 1976, Minister of Defence Chamoun called in the mostly Christian manned Lebanese Air Force to bomb leftist positions near Damour in an attempt to halt the Palestinian attack. The use of the air force caused a government crisis as the Prime Minister Rachid Karame went out of his way to stop its intervention.

A plan was devised to evacuate Damour's civilians and fortunately the majority of the population of Damour was evacuated by sea but about 500 civilians defended by some 20 mostly Ahrar troops did not make it out in time. Damour was captured, the defenders were executed, the civilians were lined up against the walls of their houses and shot, their houses were then dynamited. Many of the young women had been raped and babies had been shot at close range at the back of the head. 149 bodies lay in the streets for days afterwards and 200 other civilians were never seen again. In all about 582 civilians had been murdered. The horror did not end there, the old Christian cemetery was next, coffins were dug up the dead robbed, vaults opened, and bodies and skeletons thrown across the grave yard. Damour was then transformed into a stronghold of Fatah and the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine). The massacre and destruction of Damour is best described by Becker in the book "The PLO".

The massacre induced Muslims residing in Christian-dominated areas to flee to Muslim held areas, and vice versa. Whereas most Lebanese towns and neighbourhoods previously had been integrated, for the first time large-scale population transfers began to divide the country into segregated zones, the first step toward de facto partition.

In June, 1976, with fighting throughout the country and the Maronites on the verge of defeat, President Suleiman Frangieh called for Syrian intervention, on the grounds that the port of Beirut would be closed and that is how Syria received a large portion of their goods. Christian fears had been greatly exacerbated by the Damour massacre, and both sides felt the stakes had been raised above mere political power. Syria responded by ending its prior affiliation with the Palestinian Rejectionist Front and begin supporting the Maronite-dominated government. This technically put Syria on the same side as Israel, as Israel had already begun to supply Maronite forces with arms, tanks, and military advisors in May 1976. (Smith, op. cit., 354.). Syria had its own political and territorial interests in Lebanon, which harbored cells of the Islamist and anti-Ba'thist Muslim Brotherhood, and was also a possible route of attack for Israel.

At the President's request, Syrian troops entered Lebanon, occupying Tripoli and the Bekaa Valley, easily brushing aside the LNM and Palestinian defences. A cease-fire was imposed (Fisk, pp. 78-81), but it ultimately failed to stop the conflict, so Syria added to the pressure. With Damascus supplying arms, Christian forces managed to break through the defenses of the Tel al-Zaatar refugee camp in East Beirut, which had long been under siege. A massacre of about 2,000 Palestinians followed, but this unleashed heavy criticism against Syria from the Arab world.

In October 1976, Syria accepted the proposal of the Arab League summit in Riyadh. This gave Syria a mandate to keep 40,000 troops in Lebanon as the bulk of an Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) charged with disentangling the combatants and restoring calm. Other Arab nations were also part of the ADF, but they lost interest relatively soon, and Syria was again left in sole control, now with the ADF as a diplomatic shield against international criticism. The Civil War was officially ended at this point, and an uneasy quiet settled over Beirut and most of the rest of Lebanon. In the south, however, the climate began to deteriorate as a consequence of the gradual return of PLO combatants, who had been required to vacate central Lebanon under the terms of the Riyadh Accords.

The nation was now effectively divided, with southern Lebanon and the western half of Beirut becoming bases for the PLO and Muslim-based militias, and the Christians in control of East Beirut and the Christian section of Mt. Lebanon. The main confrontation line in divided Beirut was known as the Green Line.

In East Beirut, in 1977, Christian leaders of the National Liberal Party (NLP), the Kataeb Party and the Lebanese Renewal Party joined in the Lebanese Front, a political counterpart to the LNM. Their militias - the Tigers, Phalange and Guardians of the Cedars - entered a loose coalition known as the Lebanese Forces (LF), to form a military wing for the Lebanese Front. From the very beginning, the Kataeb/Phalange, under the leadership of Bashir Gemayel, dominated the LF. Through absorbing or destroying smaller militias, he both consolidated control and strengthened the LF into the dominant force on the Christian side.

In March the same year, Lebanese National Movement leader Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated. The murder was widely blamed on the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), acting on behalf of the Syrian government. While Jumblatt's role as leader of the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) was filled surprisingly smoothly by his son, Walid Jumblatt, the LNM disintegrated after his death. Although the anti-government pact of leftists, Shi'a, Sunni, Palestinians and Druze would stick together for some time more, their wildly divergent interests tore at opposition unity. Sensing the opportunity, Hafez al-Assad immediately got to work, to split up both the Christian and Muslim coalitions in a game of divide and rule.

Israel Defense Forces entered South Lebanon with the declared purpose "to wipe out PLO terrorist bases"[1] after a number of attacks against Israeli civilians launched by PLO from southern Lebanon. In the latest of those attacks on 11 March 1978, eleven Fatah militants landed on a beach in northern Israel and proceeded to hijack two buses full of passengers on Haifa - Tel-Aviv road, shooting at vehicles passing by. They killed 37 and wounded 76 Israelis before being killed in the firefight with the Israeli forces. [2]

Israel invaded Lebanon four days later in Operation Litani. The Israeli Army occupied most of the area south of the Litani River, resulting in the evacuation of at least 100,000 Lebanese (Smith, op. cit., 356), as well as approximately 2,000 deaths (Newsweek, 27 March 1978; Time, 3 April 1978; cited in Chomsky, Towards a New Cold War, p. 485 n115). The UN Security Council passed Resolution 425 calling for immediate Israeli withdrawal and creating the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), charged with maintaining peace.

Israeli forces withdrew later in 1978, but retained control of the southern region by managing a 12-mile wide "Security Zone" along the border. To hold these positions, Israel installed the South Lebanon Army (SLA), a Christian-Shi'a proxy militia under the leadership of Major Saad Haddad. Israel liberally supplied the SLA with arms and resources, and posted "advisors" to strengthen and direct the militia. The hard-line Israeli Prime Minister, Likud's Menachem Begin, compared the plight of the Christian minority in southern Lebanon (then about 5% of the population in SLA territory) to that of European Jews during World War II (Smith, op. cit., 355.).

Violent exchanges resumed between the PLO, Israel, and the SLA, with the PLO attacking SLA positions and firing rockets into northern Israel, Israel conducting air raids against PLO positions, and the SLA continuing its efforts to consolidate power in the border region.

Syria, meanwhile, clashed with the Phalange, a Maronite militia led by Bashir Gemayel, whose increasingly aggressive actions - such as his April 1981 attempt to capture the strategic city of Zahle in central Lebanon - were designed to thwart the Syrian goal of brushing aside Gemayel and installing Suleiman Frangieh as president. Consequently, the de facto alliance between Israel and Gemayel strengthened considerably: in the April 1981 fighting in Zahle, for example, Gemayel called for Israeli assistance, and Begin responded by sending Israeli fighter jets to the scene, which shot down two Syrian helicopters. (Smith, op. cit., p. 373.) This led to the decision by Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad to place ground-to-air missiles on the hilly perimeter of Zahle.

In August, Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin was re-elected, and in September, Begin and his defense minister Ariel Sharon began to lay plans for a second invasion of Lebanon for the purpose of driving out the PLO. Sharon's intention was to "destroy the PLO military infrastructure and, if possible, the PLO leadership itself; this would mean attacking West Beirut, where the PLO headquarters and command bunkers were located" (Smith, op. cit., p. 377).

Sharon also wanted to "ensure the presidency of Bashir Gemayel, to be elected under Israeli auspices....As a payment for Israeli assistance, Sharon expected Gemayel, once installed as president, to sign a peace treaty with Israel, presumably stabilizing forever Israel's northern border" (Ibid.). Begin brought Sharon's plan before the Knesset in December 1981; however, after strong objections were raised, Begin felt compelled to set the plan aside. But Sharon continued to press the issue. In January 1982, Sharon met with Gemayel on an Israeli vessel off the coast of Lebanon and discussed a plan "that would bring Israeli forces as far north as the edge of Beirut International Airport" (Time, 15 February 1982, cited in Chomsky, op. cit., 195). In February, with Begin's input, Yehoshua Seguy, the chief of military intelligence, was sent to Washington to discuss the issue of Lebanon with Secretary of State Alexander Haig. In the meeting, Haig "stressed that there could be no assault without a major provocation from Lebanon" (Smith, op. cit., p. 378).

Thus far, there had not been such a provocation; in fact, during the entire effective period of the cease-fire, August 1981 to May 1982, there was a total of one PLO rocket attack from Lebanese territory, in May. The attack was a retaliation for Israel's 9 May bombing of PLO positions in Lebanon, which was itself a retaliation for the PLO bombing of a Jerusalem bus. (Chomsky, op. cit., p. 196-7.) This particular exchange points up a central problem with the cease-fire from the Israeli perspective: it applied only to the border with Lebanon, meaning that PLO attacks from other locations, such as Jordan and the West Bank, could (and did) continue unabated, while an Israeli response directed against the PLO in Lebanon would technically be a violation of the cease-fire.

Arafat, for his part, refused to condemn attacks occurring outside of Lebanon, on the grounds that the cease-fire was only relevant to the Lebanese theater. (Smith, op. cit., p. 376). Arafat's interpretation underscored the fact that the cease-fire agreement did nothing to address ongoing violence between the PLO and Israel in other theaters. Israel thus continued to weather PLO attacks throughout the cease-fire period; at the same time, it violated the terms of the cease-fire by committing "2125 violations of Lebanese airspace and 652 violations of Lebanese territorial waters" from August 1981 to May 1982, including the abovementioned 9 May bombing and the 21 April bombing of coastal PLO targets south of Beirut (Chomsky, op. cit., p. 195; the figures on territorial violations are cited by Alexander Cockburn & James Ridgeway, Village Voice, 22 June 1982, quoting UN records).

On 3 June 1982, the Abu Nidal Organization attempted to assassinate Israeli ambassador Shlomo Argov in London. Abu Nidal had assassinated numerous PLO diplomats, and attempted to kill both Arafat and Mahmud Abbas, and was in fact condemned to death by the PLO (Chomsky, op. cit., p. 196). Additionally, British intelligence reported that the attempt had likely been sponsored by Iraq, and Israeli intelligence agreed; however, none of this dissuaded Ariel Sharon and Menachem Begin, who ordered a retaliatory aerial attack on PLO and PFLP targets in West Beirut that led to over 100 casualties (Smith, op. cit., p. 378), a clear violation of the cease-fire.

The PLO responded by launching a counterattack from Lebanon with rockets and artillery, also a clear violation of the cease-fire; Israel declared that this was the immediate cause of its subsequent decision to invade. Meanwhile, on 5 June, the UN Security Council unanimously passed a resolution (UNSCR 509) calling for "all the parties to the conflict to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border and no later than 0600 hours local time on Sunday, 6 June 1982." [3].

launched what they called "Operation Peace for Galilee", attacking PLO bases in Lebanon. Israeli forces quickly drove 25 miles into Lebanon, moving into East Beirut with the tacit support of Maronite leaders and militia. When the Israeli cabinet convened to authorize the invasion, Sharon described it as a plan to advance 40 kilometers into Lebanon, demolish PLO strongholds, and establish an expanded security zone that would put northern Israel out of range of PLO rockets; in fact, Israeli chief of staff Rafael Eitan and Sharon had already ordered the invading forces to head straight for Beirut, in accord with Sharon's blueprint dating to September 1981. After the invasion had begun, the UN Security Council passed a further resolution on 6 June, UNSCR 509, which reaffirms UNSCR 508 and "Demands that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon" [4]. Thus far the US had not used its veto; however, on 8 June, the US vetoed a proposed resolution that "Reiterates [the] demand that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon" [5], thereby giving an implicit nod of assent to the Israeli invasion.

Main article: Siege of Beirut

By 15 June, Israeli units were entrenched outside Beirut. The United States called for PLO withdrawal from Lebanon, and Sharon began to order bombing raids of West Beirut, targeting some 16,000 PLO troops who had retreated into fortified positions. Meanwhile, Arafat attempted through negotiations to salvage politically what was clearly a disaster for the PLO, an attempt which eventually succeeded once the multinational force arrived to evacuate the PLO.

The fighting in Beirut resulted in approximately 6,700 deaths, 80 percent civilian, with 1100 PLO deaths against 88 for the IDF; fierce artillery duels between the IDF and the PLO, and PLO shelling of Christian neighborhoods of East Beirut at the outset gave way to escalating aerial IDF bombardment beginning on 21 July [6][7]. It is commonly estimated that during the entire campaign, approximately 20,000 were killed on all sides, including many civilians, and 30,000 were wounded.

On 26 June, a UN Security Council resolution was proposed that "Demands the immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces engaged round Beirut, to a distance of 10 kilometres from the periphery of that city, as a first step towards the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, and the simultaneous withdrawal of the Palestinian armed forces from Beirut, which shall retire to the existing camps" [8]; the United States vetoed the resolution because it was "a transparent attempt to preserve the P.L.O. as a viable political force" (New York Times, 27 June 1982, cited in Chomsky, op. cit., p. 198), an indication of Washington's support for Sharon's objective of destroying the PLO before it could negotiate a withdrawal agreement.

Finally, amid escalating violence and civilian casualties, Philip Habib was once again sent to restore order, which he accomplished on 12 August on the heels of Sharon's intensive, day-long bombardment of West Beirut. The Habib-negotiated truce called for the withdrawal of both Israeli and PLO elements, as well as a multinational force composed of U.S. Marines along with French and Italian units that would ensure the departure of the PLO and protect defenseless civilians.

Main article: Multinational Force in Lebanon

A multinational force landed in Beirut on August 20, 1982 to oversee the PLO withdrawal from Lebanon and U.S. mediation resulted in the evacuation of Syrian troops and PLO fighters from Beirut. The agreement also provided for the deployment of a multinational force composed of U.S. Marines along with French and Italian units.

However, Israel claimed that some 2,000 PLO militants were hiding in Palestinian refugee camps on the outskirts of Beirut. Accordingly, on 12 September, Bashir Gemayel, who had been elected president under Israeli military control on 23 August, agreed to send troops from his Phalange militia into the camps. Then, on 14 September, Gemayel was assassinated. Many have suspected that Syria had a hand in his assassination.

See Sabra and Shatila massacre

After conferring with Phalange leaders, Sharon and Eitan bypassed the Israeli cabinet and sent Israeli troops into West Beirut, violating the Habib agreement; these troops helped transport approximately 200 Phalange personnel to the camps, which the Phalangists entered on 16 September at 6:00 P.M. The Phalangists remained in the camps until the morning of 19 September, massacring an estimated 700-3000 Palestinians, according to official Israeli statistics, "none apparently members of any PLO unit" (Smith, op. cit., 380-1).

The Kahan Commission, set up by the Israeli government to investigate the circumstances of the massacre, held Sharon and Eitan indirectly responsible, concluding that the Israeli officials should have known what would happen if they sent 200 anti-Palestinian militants into Palestinian refugee camps. The Commission recommended that Sharon resign his post as Defense Minister, which he did, though he remained in the government as an influential Minister without Portfolio (Chomsky, op. cit., 406).

The massacres made the headlines all over the world, and calls were heard for the international community to assume responsibility for stabilizing Lebanon. As a result, the multinational forces that had begun exiting Lebanon after the PLO's evacuation returned as peacekeepers. With U.S. backing, Amine Gemayel was chosen by the Lebanese parliament to succeed his brother as President and focused anew on securing the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces.

Main article: May 17 Agreement

On May 17, 1983, Amin Gemayel's Lebanon, Israel, and the United States signed an agreement (text) on Israeli withdrawal that was conditioned on the departure of Syrian troops; reportedly after the US and Israel exerted severe pressure on Gemayel. The agreement stated that "the state of war between Israel and Lebanon has been terminated and no longer exists." Thus, the agreement in effect amounted to a peace agreement with Israel, and was additionally seen by many Lebanese Muslims as an attempt for Israel to gain a permanent hold on the Lebanese South[9]. The May 17 Agreement was widely portrayed in the Arab world as an imposed surrender, and Amin Gemayel was accused of acting as a Quisling President; tensions in Lebanon hardened considerably. Syria strongly opposed the agreement and declined to discuss the withdrawal of its troops, effectively stalemating further progress.

In August 1983, Israel withdrew from the Chouf District (southeast of Beirut), thus removing the buffer between the Druze and the Christian militias and triggering another round of brutal fighting. By September, the Druze had gained control over most of the Chouf, and Israeli forces had pulled out from all but the southern security zone; the IDF would remain in this zone, in violation of UN Security Council resolution 425, until the year 2000.

The virtual collapse of the Lebanese Army in February 1984, following the defection of many Muslim and Druze units to militias, was a major blow to the government. With the U.S. Marines looking ready to withdraw, Syria and Muslim groups stepped up pressure on Gemayel. On 5 March the Lebanese Government cancelled the May 17 Agreement; the Marines departed a few weeks later.

File:Lebanon civil war map 1983.gif

This period of chaos witnessed the beginning of attacks against U.S. and Western interests, such as the 18 April 1983 suicide attack at the U.S. Embassy in West Beirut (63 dead). Then, on 23 October, in the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing which hit the headquarters of the U.S. and French forces (241 American and 58 French servicemen killed), the multinational force was the target of a devastating suicide bombing[10]. Following the embassy bombing, the Reagan White House had "ordered naval bombardments of Druze positions, which resulted in numerous casualties, mostly non-combatant," and the "reply to the American bombardments" was the suicide attack (Smith, op. cit., 383). Months later, American University of Beirut President Malcolm Kerr was murdered on January 18, 1984. After US forces withdrew in February 1984, anti-US attacks continued including a second bombing of the U.S. embassy annex in East Beirut on 20 September 1984 (9 dead, including 2 US servicemen).

During these years, the Hizbullah emerged from a loose coalition of Shi'a groups resisting the Israeli occupation of the splintered from the main Shi'a movement, Nabih Berri's Amal Movement. The group found inspiration for its revolutionary Islamism in the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and gained early support from about 1,500 Iranian Pasdaran Guards. With Iranian assistance, and a large pool of disaffected Shi'a refugees to draw upon, Hizbullah quickly grew into a strong fighting force.

Between 1985 and 1989, sectarian conflict worsened as various efforts at national reconciliation failed. Heavy fighting took place in the War of the Camps of 1985-86 as a Syrian-backed coalition headed by the Amal militia sought to rout the PLO from their Lebanese strongholds. Many thousands of Palestinians died, and the Sabra, Shatila, and Bourj al-Barajneh refugee camps were largely destroyed. (Fisk, 609)

Major combat returned to Beirut in 1987, when Palestinians, leftists, and Druze fighters allied against Amal, eventually drawing further Syrian intervention. Violent confrontation flared up again in Beirut in 1988 between Amal and Hizbullah. Hizbullah swiftly seized command of several Amal-held parts of the city, and for the first time emerged as a strong force in the capital.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Rashid Karami, head of a government of national unity set up after the failed peace efforts of 1984, was assassinated on June 1, 1987. President Gemayel's term of office expired in September 1988. Before stepping down, he appointed another Maronite Christian, Lebanese Armed Forces Commanding General Michel Aoun, as acting Prime Minister, contravening the National Pact. Conflict in this period was also exacerbated by increasing Iraqi involvement, as Saddam Hussein searched for proxy battlefields of the Iran-Iraq War. To counter Iran's influence through Amal and Hizbullah, Iraq backed Christian groups; Saddam Hussein helped Aoun between 1988-1990.[11]

Muslim groups rejected the violation of the National Pact and pledged support to Selim al-Hoss, a Sunni who had succeeded Karami. Lebanon was thus divided between a Christian military government in East Beirut, and a Muslim government in West Beirut with no President.

The Taif Agreement of 1989 had marked the beginning of the end of the fighting. In January of that year, a committee appointed by the Arab League, chaired by Kuwait and including Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco, had begun to formulate solutions to the conflict, leading to a meeting of Lebanese parliamentarians in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, where they agreed to the national reconciliation accord in October. The agreement provided a large role for Syria in Lebanese affairs. Returning to Lebanon, they ratified the agreement on November 4 and elected Rene Mouawad as President the following day. Military leader Michel Aoun in East Beirut refused to accept Mouawad, and denounced the Taif Agreement.

Mouawad was assassinated 16 days later in a car bombing in Beirut on 22 November as his motorcade returned from Lebanese independence day ceremonies. He was succeeded by the Elias Hrawi (who remained in office until 1998). Aoun again refused to accept the election, and dissolved Parliament.

On January 16, 1990, Gen. Aoun ordered all Lebanese media to cease using terms like "President" or "Minister" to describe Hrawi and other participants in the Taif government. The Lebanese Forces, which had grown into a rival powerbroker in the Christian parts of the capital, protested by suspending all its broadcasts; Aoun shut down other newspapers who refused to comply. (Harris, 268) Tension with the LF grew, as Aoun feared that the militia was planning to link up with the Hrawi administration.

In early 1990 Aoun's forces clashed with the LF, after Aoun had stated that it was in the national interest for the government to "unify the weapons" (i.e. that the LF must submit to his authority as acting head of state). This brought fierce fighting to East Beirut, and although the LF made initial advances, the intra-Christian warfare eventually sapped the militia of most of its fighting strength; it then turned to Syria for support.

In August 1990, the Lebanese Parliament - which didn't heed Aoun's order to dissolve - and the new president agreed on constitutional amendments embodying some of the political reforms envisioned at Taif. The National Assembly expanded to 108 seats and was for the first time divided equally between Christians and Muslims.

By March 1990, after having subdued the LF, Aoun launched what he termed a "War of Liberation" against the Syrians and their Lebanese militia allies. As a result, Syrian pressure on his Lebanese Army and militia pockets in East Beirut grew heavier, and as Saddam Hussein focused his attention on Kuwait, Iraqi supplies dwindled. Still, Aoun persisted in the "War of Liberation", denouncing the regime of Hafez al-Assad and claiming that he fought for Lebanon's independence. While he seems to have had significant Christian support for this, he was still perceived as a sectarian leader among others by the Muslim population, who distrusted his agenda; he was also plagued by the challenge to his legitimacy put forth by the Syrian-backed West Beirut government of Elias Hrawi.

In October 1990, Syria launched a major operation by its army, air force and Lebanese allies against his stronghold around the presidential palace, where hundreds of Aoun supporters were then executed (see October 13 Massacre). It then cleared out the last Aounist pockets, cementing its hold on the capital. Aoun fled to the French Embassy in Beirut, and later into exile in Paris. He was not able to return until May 2005.

William Harris claims that the Syrian operation could not take place until Syria had reached an agreement with the United States, that in exchange for support against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War, it would convince Israel not to attack Syrian aircraft approaching Beirut. Aoun had claimed in 1989 that the United States "has sold Lebanon to Syria" (Harris, p. 260).

In March 1991, parliament passed an amnesty law that pardoned all political crimes prior to its enactment. The amnesty was not extended to crimes perpetrated against foreign diplomats or certain crimes referred by the cabinet to the Higher Judicial Council. In May 1991, the militias (with the important exception of Hezbollah) were dissolved, and the Lebanese Armed Forces began to slowly rebuild themselves as Lebanon's only major non-sectarian institution.

Some violence still occurred. In late December 1991 a car bomb (estimated to carry 220 pounds of TNT) exploded in the Muslim neighborhood of Basta. At least thirty people were killed, and 120 wounded, including former Prime Minister Shafik Wazzan, who was riding in a bulletproof car.

Since the end of the war, the Lebanese have conducted several elections, most of the militias have been weakened or disbanded, and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have extended central government authority over about two-thirds of the country. Only the radical Shi'a party Hizbullah retains its weapons, due to what it claims is legitimate resistance to Israel in the Shebaa Farms area.

Lebanon still bears deep scars from the civil war. In all, it is estimated that more than 100,000 people were killed, and another 100,000 handicapped by injuries. Up to one-fifth of the pre-war population, or about 900,000 people, were displaced from their homes, and perhaps a quarter of a million emigrated permanently. Thousands of land mines remain buried in the previously contested areas. Some Western hostages kidnapped during the mid-1980s (many claim by Hizbullah, though the movement denies this) were held until May 1992. Lebanese victims of kidnapping and wartime "disappeared" are less talked about, but number in the tens of thousands.

Car bombs became a favored weapon of violent groups worldwide, following their frequent (and often effective) use during the war. In the 15 years of strife, there were at least 3,641 car bombs, which left 4,386 people dead and thousands more injured [12].

The country has made progress toward rebuilding its political institutions and regaining its national sovereignty since the end of the war, establishing a political system that gives Muslims a greater say in the political process. Critics, however, charge that the new arrangements institutionalize sectarian divisions in the government.

• Lebanese civil war from April 13, 1975 to October 13, 1990 Full of Pictures
• Lebanese civil war
• The Lebanese civil war and the Taef agreement

• The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967-1976 Khazen Farid El (2000) (ISBN 0674081056)
• The Bullet Collection, a book by Patricia Ward, is an excellent account of human experience during the Lebanese Civil War.
• Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-92 O'Ballance Edgar (1998) (ISBN 0312215932)
• Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976 Salibi Kamal S. (1976) (ISBN 0882060104)
• Death of a country: The civil war in Lebanon. Bulloch John (1977) (ISBN 0297772880)
• Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions (Princeton Series on the Middle East) Harris William W (1997) (ISBN 1558761152)
• The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians Noam Chomsky (1983, 1999) (ISBN 0896086011)
• History of Syria Including Lebanon and Palestine, Vol. 2 Hitti Philip K. (2002) (ISBN 1931956618)
• Lebanon: A Shattered Country: Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon, Revised Edition Picard, Elizabeth (2002) (ISBN 084191415X)
• Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues (Contemporary Issues in the Middle East) Haley P. Edward , Snider Lewis W. (1979) (ISBN 0815622104)
• Lebanon: Fire and Embers : A History of the Lebanese Civil War by Hiro, Dilip (1993) (ISBN 0312097247)
• Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War Fisk, Robert (2001) (ISBN 0192801309)
• Syria and the Lebanese Crisis Dawisha A. I. (1980) (ISBN 0312782039)
• Syria's Terrorist War on Lebanon and the Peace Process Deeb Marius (2003) (ISBN 1403962480)
• The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985 Rabinovich Itamar (1985) (ISBN 0801493137)

• Harab libnan (TV-Series). Lebanon. 2001. {{cite AV media}}: Unknown parameter |director= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |distributor= ignored (|publisher= suggested) (help)

• Lebanese groups unite over Syria-BBC News 13 December 2004
• Lebanon Facts-PBS Frontline Series May 2003
• Links and Resources-PBS Frontline May 2003
• Lebanon's Forgotten Civil War-Washington Post Foreign Service 20 December 1999
• Pictures of Battle Scared Beirut-Travel Adventures.

• Center for Lebanese Study-Oxford University
• Country Profile: Lebanon-BBC News
• Timeline: Lebanon A chronology of key events-BBC News 14 February 2005
• A detailed chronology on the Lebanese War-Cederland